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KURT STEPHENSON*

Groundwater Management in
Nebraska: Governing the Commons
through Local Resource Districts
ABSTRACT
In many areas of the Great Plains, a large share of the responsibility
for establishinggroundwateruse and access controls rests with local
resource districts. Many policy observers identify local inaction as
a contributingcause to the rapid depletion of groundwater supplies
in the region. Yet, the charge that local resource districts are
incapableof effective resource management may be exaggerated. This
paper describes a comprehensive groundwater control program
established by Nebraska's Upper Republican Natural Resource
District (URNRD). An analysis of the rule-making behavior of this
district identifies a variety of factors which facilitated self-regulation.
INTRODUCTION
The depletion of the Ogallala aquifer has raised national
awareness and concern about the vulnerability of groundwater supplies
on the Great Plains.' Groundwater is being extracted much faster than
the natural rate of recharge in many areas overlying the Ogallala-a
situation typically referred to as groundwater mining.2 While legal
doctrines and regulatory authority over the groundwater resource vary
between the states, Texas, Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado all rely in part
on locally elected resource districts to manage the groundwater
withdrawals and access.3 In Texas and Nebraska local districts exercise
almost sole authority to establish groundwater controls.
In the legal and policy literature from the Great Plains a large
part of the blame for the excesses of groundwater mining has been placed
with these local governing bodies. Local resource districts generally are
depicted as staunchly resistant to even the most elementary management

* The author is a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Agricultural and
Applied Economics at Virginia Tech.
1. Erla Zwingle, Wellspring of the High Plains,NATIONAL GEOcRAPHIC, Mar. 1993, at 80.
2. J.David Aiken, Ground Water Mining Law and Policy, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 505 (1982).
3. Rebecca S. Roberts, Groundwater Management Institutions, in GROUNDWATER
EXPLOITATION IN THE HIGH PLAINS 88 (David E. Kromm & Stephen E. White eds., 1992).
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forms. Keller, Heatwole and Weber state that "it may be difficult to
mobilize popular support for regulatory policies, since district officials are
more in agreement against regulation than the general population."4 This
resistance has been attributed to a number of factors including a highly
individualistic ideology and an unwillingness to sacrifice current
economic returns for the most basic conservation programs.' Nebraska's
local resource districts (Natural Resource Districts or NRDs) have been
described as "closed clubs of irrigators"6 that are "destined to preserve
the status quo while giving the appearance of movement toward the
solution of pressing water problems."7 Others suggest that professional
and financial limitations effectively restrict the ability of Nebraska NRDs
to effectively manage the groundwater resource.8
An independent line of research, however, has begun to focus on
how local groups collectively manage shared resources. This diverse
group of researchers including economists, anthropologists, political
scientists and sociologists is undertaking more careful and detailed
analysis of the self-regulating institutional systems devised by local
groups to allocate important resources. Much of this literature has
focused on the variety of ways in which local users have devised
successful management schemes for shared resources.9 Others have
attempted to identify the factors which explain why some of the groups
succeed and others fail to effectively manage these resources."°
Yet, few detailed studies exist in the policy literature concerning
how and why local efforts at managing the High Plains' groundwater
resource function and perform. Questions remain such as "How do they
view the problems they face? What explains the choices that have been
made? and What, if anything, have they accomplished?". Contrary to the
characterization in the majority of the policy literature, the response of
local resource districts to groundwater mining has been more varied and

4. Lawrence F. Keller, et al., Managing Crisis: The Effectiveness of Local Districts for
Control of Groundwater Mining, 17 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 647, 652 (1981).
5. Rebecca S. Roberts & Jacque Emel, Uneven Development and 'the Tragedy of the
Commons: Competing Images for Nature-Society Analysis, 68 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 249, 257

(1992).
6. Peter J.Longo& Robert D. Miewald, Institutionsin Water Policy: The Caseof Nebraska,
29 NAT. RESOURCE J. 751, 762 (1989).

7. Id. at 757.
8. ZACHARY A. SMITH, GROUNDWATER IN THE WEST 142 (1989); Longo & Miewald,
supra note 6, at 756. ,
9. See THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE OF ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL

RESOURCES (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987); See also MAKING THE
COMMONS WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND PoucY (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1992).

10. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (1990); Robert Wade, The Managementof the Common PropertyResource: CollectiveAction
as an Alternative to Privatizationor State Regulation, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECoN. 95 (1987).
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complex than simply a unified stand to protect the status quo." This
paper adds detail to this diversity by describing the groundwater
management system designed and implemented by Nebraska's Upper
Republican Natural Resource District (URNRD). The URNRD
groundwater control program is one of the most comprehensive state or
local efforts to manage the groundwater resource in the Ogallala region.
An analysis of the URNRD rule-making behavior is provided that
identifies the set of factors that contributed to the development of the
URNRD's groundwater management system. It is hoped that a more
complete understanding about the problems and successes of the URNRD
will provide an incentive for a closer assessment of the future role that
these local resource institutions will play in groundwater management.
LOCAL AUTHORITY TO MANAGE GROUNDWATER SUPPLY IN
NEBRASKA
Prior to 1975, Nebraska groundwater law was governed almost
exclusively by piecemeal judicial and legislative adjustments to the
reasonable use doctrine.12 A modification of the English absolute
doctrine, reasonable use grants a nearly unlimited pumping privilege to
all overlying landowners. Landowners are granted access to all water
beneath their land and are entitled to pump as much water as can be put
to beneficial or reasonable use on their overlying land. 3 When the
Nebraska Supreme Court established the. reasonable use doctrine in its
first well interference case, the court also stated that in the event of
insufficient groundwater supply, each user is entitled to a reasonable
proportion of the whole groundwater supply. 4 The mixture of
reasonable use and correlative rights 5 language created what is
16
sometimes referred to the "Nebraska Rule of Reasonable Use."
Through 1975, this common law framework was only slightly modified
by legislation. 7
This legal structure was ill-prepared to manage the demands
placed on the groundwater resource that came with the agricultural and

11. Roberts, supra note 3.
12. J. David Aiken & Raymond J. Supalla, Ground Water Mining and Western Water
Rights Law: The Nebraska Experience, 24 S.D. L. Riv. 607, 618 (1979).
13. J. David Aiken, Nebraska Groundwater Law and Administration, 59 NEB.L. REV. 917,
923-24 (1980).
14. Olson v. City of Wahoo, 248 N.W. 304 (Neb. 1933).
15. Correlative rights, often called the California rule of correlative rights, represents
an elaboration of reasonable use. Specifically, in times of shortage, the remaining supply can
be divided between users on a proportional basis. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 926.
16. Smith, supra note 8, at 134.
17. Aiken, supra note 13, at 942-57.
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irrigation boom of the 1970s. The advent of high-capacity pumps and
efficient water delivery systems meant that the common law structure
presented few effective limits on access to and use of the resource. In the
event of groundwater mining, landowners did not have a secure claim to
the water underlying their land since this common law framework did
not define a user's rights to the resource with respect to others."8
Without limits to access and use, users and the public were offered no
protection against a mining situation and had little individual incentive
to conserve water. A resource characterized by nearly unlimited rights to
access and use has been labeled as an "open-access" situation.1'
In response to rapid drops in groundwater levels in several
regions of the state, the Nebraska Unicameral enacted the Ground Water
Management Act (GWMA) in 1975.'o This law granted primary
responsibility for regulating groundwater with the local Natural Resource
Districts (NRDs). A total of 23 NRDs blanket the state. Unlike other local
resource districts in the region, Nebraska's NRDs are multi-purpose
resource districts that are given a wide range of natural resource
management responsibilities including soil and water conservation, flood
and soil erosion control, drainage, rural water supply, recreation, forestry
and range management, and wildlife habitat management.2 The districts
are governed by a locally elected board of directors and day-to-day
operations are run by a manager and a full-time professional staff.
The GWMA established the NRDs as the central figure in state
groundwater policy. The NRDs were granted the sole authority to alter
rules governing use and access to groundwater in order to deal with
groundwater mining. In order to exercise this authority, the state
Department of Water Resources (DWR) must first approve an NRD
request to create a. groundwater "control area."' While the DWR
determines whether a control area will be designated, the NRD is the
only organization that may request a control area designation.' Thus,
the decision to pursue groundwater regulation under the GWMA is left
entirely with the NRD.

18. Richard S. Harnsberger, et al., Groundwater: From Windmill to Comprehensive Public
Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179, 205-6 (1973).
19. S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, Common Propertyas a Concept in Natural
Resource Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975); Daniel W. Bromley, Comment, 21 J. OF
ENVTL. ECON. AND MANAGEMENT 92 (1991); George D. Santopietro & Leonard A. Shabman,
Can Privatization Be Inefficient?: The Case of the Chesapeake Bay Oyster Fishery, 26 JOURNAL OF
ECON. ISSUES 407 (1992).
20. 1975 Neb. Laws, LB 577, NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-656 to 46-674 (1988).
21. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-3229 (1991).
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-658 (1988).
23. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-658(1) (1988).
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If the DWR approves the NRD request, the NRD may exercise a
number of regulatory options within the control area. The GWMA grants
the NRD Board of Directors the right to set access limits to the aquifer.
The NRDs are granted authority to impose an annual well drilling
moratorium. 4 The language in the GWMA, however, suggests that a
moratorium should be considered as a last resort measure to manage a
severe depletion problem. A complete ban on well drilling is considered
constitutionally suspect under the Nebraska reasonable use doctrine since
the "right of access is arguably a constitutionally vested right that cannot
be taken away without payment of compensation."' In addition to the
moratorium, the NRDs also are authorized to impose well-spacing
requirements which are more restrictive than those required by state
law . 6
Within a control area, the GWMA provides the NRDs broad
discretionary powers with which to regulate groundwater use.
Specifically, systems of rotational pumping are authorized which place
restrictions on when groundwater can be pumped. ' The NRDs also may
limit total withdrawals of groundwater by allocating how much
groundwater can be pumped by different groundwater users.' An NRD
may require the installation-of water meters on wells in order to measure
total well withdrawals.2 In addition to these specific rules, the NRDs
also may adopt other reasonable rules not specifically mentioned in the
law but that are nonetheless deemed necessary to manage a groundwater
depletion problem Implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and
financing of these regulatory programs are also the responsibility of the
NRD. 1 Thus, Nebraska groundwater policy is built squarely on the idea
of local control.
UPPER REPUBLICAN NRD RULE-MAKING CONDUCT
UNDER THE GWMA
This section describes the history and evolution of the
groundwater policy in Nebraska's Upper Republican Natural Resource
District (URNRD). The URNRD covers Chase, Dundy and Perkins

24. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-666(5) (1988).

25.

NEBRASKA NATURAL RESouRcE CoMMisION, PouCY STUDY ON SELECTED WATER

RIGHTs ISSUES 2-2 (1983).
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-666(1)(c) (1988).
27. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-666(1)(b) (1988).
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-666(l)(a) (1988).
29. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-666(1)(d) (1988).
30. NED. REv. STAT. § 46-666(1)(e) (1988).
31. Aiken & Supalla, supra note 12.
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counties in the far southwest corner of the state. This area has
particularly important implications for future groundwater policy in
Nebraska since this area has suffered the most severe declines in
groundwater levels since the advent of pump irrigation.'
Like many other areas in Nebraska, the vast majority of all
groundwater in the URNRD is pumped by irrigators. But unlike other
areas, the southwest corner of the state experienced only minimal
irrigation development up through the mid-1960s. The light soils of the
region prevented the wide-spread use of the prevailing water delivery
system existing at the time-flood irrigation.' The advent of the centerpivot system, however, rapidly changed agricultural practices in the area.
In 1965 about 50,000 acres were irrigated in the three-county area.' In
just 10 years the number of irrigated acres had increased to more than a
quarter million.' Almost all of these new acres were irrigated with
center-pivot systems. 6 The rate of irrigation development was further
fueled by strong commodity prices in the early 1970s.1
By the early 1970s, water levels in irrigation wells across the
district had begun to drop. In response, the URNRD funded a
groundwater model study designed to explain groundwater levels and
predict future changes in groundwater levels. The results of the
groundwater model confirmed that the irrigation development was the
cause of the declines. Furthermore, the model demonstrated the extent to
which the aquifer was overdrawn. According to model projections,
limiting access and cutting groundwater use in half would be insufficient
to balance recharge with withdrawals.'
Faced with this situation, the URNRD requested that the DWR
designate the district as a control area. In 1977 the Director of Water
Resources approved the URNRD control area request?' After the control
area designation, the URNRD became the first NRD in Nebraska to enact

32. See NEBRASKA CONSERVATION AND SURvEY DvisioN, THE GROUNDWATER ATLAS OF
NEBRASKA (1986).

33. Kurt Stephenson, Governing the Commons: History and Evaluation of Local
Democratic Groundwater Management in the Nebraska Upper Republican Natural Resource
District 109-111 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Nebraska (Lincoln)).
34. Id. at 131.
35. Id. at 131.
36. Id. at 122.
37. Gerold Dale McKenzie, Economic Factors that Affect Groundwater Irrigation
Development in Nebraska (1988) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Nebraska

(Lincoln)).
38. URNRD Groundwater Model Results, 1978-79.
39. The entire district however, was not designated as a control area. The small section

of the district that lays south of the Republican River remained outside the control area
because the aquifer is thin or absent in this area.
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groundwater use and access restrictions under the GWMA. The basic
structure of these rules has remained in place since first being established
in 1978.
Access Limitations: In order to effectively manage the rate of
groundwater withdrawals, the URNRD Board realized that effective
limits on access to the aquifer needed to be established. Although the
URNRD Board considered imposing a well moratorium on several
occasions, at that time the constitutional questions and well driller
opposition realistically eliminated this option. Furthermore, many farmers
in the area thought it would be unfair to deny the opportunity to irrigate
to those individuals who did not cause the depletion problem.4
Given these limitations, the URNRD developed an alternative
approach to limiting access to groundwater. Well-spacing requirements
have been an accepted regulatory requirement in Nebraska since the late
1950s, but have been established primarily as a mechanism to prevent
seasonal well interference rather than to limit access.' Under Nebraska
state law, the well spacing requirement between irrigation wells is 600
feet. 0 In 1978, the URNRD imposed a 3,300 feet spacing requirement in
certain areas within the control area." Where applied, a 3,300 feet
spacing requirement would sharply curtail new well drilling. This more
restrictive well spacing requirement, however, was limited only to areas
designated as "critical townships". 0 Using well measurement data,
critical townships were identified by the annual rate of decline in the
aquifer's saturated thickness." In 1978, all townships where the annual
decline in saturated thickness exceeded one percent were declared as
critical. That year about a third of the district was classified under the
critical township designation and thus subject to the more stringent wellspacing requirements. Such an approach ensured that groundwater
depletion would not accelerate in the most critical areas, but, at the same
time, this system allowed a pattern of development and depletion to
occur before access was limited.
Over the next 15 years, new well drilling declined sharply for
two reasons. First, high interest rates and low commodity prices during
the 1980s sharply curtailed irrigation demand.' Second, when the farm
economy began to recover in the early 1990s, the URNRD tightened the

40. Aiken & Supalla, supra note 12, at 628.
41. URNRD public hearing transcripts, September 27, 1977.
42. Aiken, supra note 13, at 950.
43. Ni. REV. STAT. § 46-651 to 46-655 (Reissue 1988).
44.URNRD Rules and Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 1, Rule 5 (1978).
45. Id. A township is a six mile square tract of land.
46. Id. at Rule I (d).
47. Stephenson, supra note 33, at 289.
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rules governing aquifer access. In 1991, the critical township criteria was
tightened to an annual decline in saturated thickness of one-half of one
percent.* The following year the critical township was again reduced to
one-fourth of one percent."' Each action significantly expanded the area
subject to the more stringent well-spacing requirements. Furthermore,
well-spacing requirements in critical townships were extended from 3,300
feet to one mile in 1992.1 The combination of the more restrictive critical
township criteria and well-spacing requirements effectively eliminated
new well drilling in about 85 percent of the control area.
Recently, high commodity prices placed increased pressure to
drill new irrigation wells on land still not designated as critical.
Furthermore, above average rainfall temporarily slowed the decline in
water tables, threatening to significantly reduce the amount of land
covered under the critical township designation. The combination of these
two factors threatened to undermine the system to limit access. In
response, the URNRD approved a well drilling moratorium over the
entire control area in February 1997.'1 This is the first well moratorium
ever to be imposed in Nebraska.
Use Limitations: To manage the groundwater withdrawals from
established wells, the URNRD implemented a system to allocate
groundwater among individual users. In 1978 the URNRD required each
high-capacity well in the district to be equipped with an approved flow
meter by April 1980.52 This was the first area on the Great Plains that
required well meters on all irrigation wells.'
The URNRD also established quantitative limitations on
groundwater withdrawals.- The total volume of water that a well
operator is permitted to withdraw is assigned to each well. Groundwater
use per well is based on the total amount of water that can be applied on
each acre irrigated by the well. Thus, a 15 inch allocation grants the well
operator the equivalent amount of water to cover each irrigated acre
assigned to that well in 15 acre inches of water in a given year.55 To
grant flexibility in individual water management, the per-acre allocation
is summed over a five year period and is referred to as a five year

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
(1978).

URNRD Rules and Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 14, Rule 7, (1991).
URNRD Rules and Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 15, Rule 7, (1992).
Id.
URNRD Rules and Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 20, Rule 16, (1997).
URNRD Rules and Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 1, Rule 3 (b),

53. Roberts, supra note 3, at 94-95.

54. URNRD Rules and Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 1, Rule 3, (1977);
Order 3, Rule 4 (1980); Order 6, Rule 4, (1983); Order 11, Rule 5, (1988); Order 16, Rule 5
(1993).
55. An acre-inch is approximately 27,000 gallons.
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allocation period. Thus, a 15 inch annual allocation grants a irrigator the
right to pump a maximum of 75 inches per acre over five years. There are
no restrictions on when or how the 75 inches is allocated through the five
year allocation period.
After a trial allocation period (1980-82), the first five year
allocation (1983-1987) was set at 80 inches per acre for acres irrigated with
center-pivots (16 inches per year),s The following two allocation periods
were marked by a gradual tightening of the allowable water use. The
1988-1992 and 1993-97 allocations established five year allocations of 75
inches per acre (15 inch annual allocation) and 72.5 inch per acre (14.5
inch annual allocation) respectively." These five-year allocations were
not established to achieve a specified aquifer life goal or a specified target
rate of decline in the aquifer's saturated thickness. Instead, allocations
were set so that a farmer using sound water management practices could
continuously grow corn. In adopting allocations, the URNRD board
sought to avoid undermining irrigator support for the rules. Yet, the
annual water use rates reflected by the allocations were not so generous
as to be nonbinding. When allocations were set, typically about 15 to 25
percent of all wells pumped more water in the previous allocation period
than was allowed by the new allocation level.' For example, when the
1988-1992 allocation was being considered, 19.8 percent of all irrigation
systems exceeded an annual average application rate of 15 inches per acre
between 1983 and 1987.-" Thus, URNRD groundwater use rules act as
a way to reduce a free-rider problem-inducing technically inefficient
groundwater users to adopt better water management practices.
To allow flexibility into the allocation system, the URNRD also
provides irrigators with options on how to meet the withdrawal limits
through "carry-forward" and "pooling" provisions. These rules are
similar to the bubble, netting and banking provisions in the national air
pollution control program. To encourage irrigators to reduce water use
below the allocation, the well operator is allowed to bank or "carryforward" unused water from one allocation period to the next.6° Pooling
allows the irrigation well operator to combine allocations from different
wells as so long as the combined allocation does not exceed the sum of
56. URNRD Rules and Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 6, Rule 4, (1983).
To allow more water intensive gravity flow irrigators an opportunity to adjust to the new
rules, the 1983-87 allocation permitted the withdrawal of up to one hundred inches per acre
for wells irrigating through gravity flow distribution systems (22 inch annual allocation).
57. URNRD Rules and Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 11, Rule 5, (1988)
and Order 16, Rule 5 (1993).
58. Stephenson, supra note 33, at 233, 248.
59. Id. at 248.
60. Carry-forward provisions were initially established under URNRD Rules and
Regulations for Groundwater Control, Order 1, Rule 3 (3)(b) (1978).
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the individual wells.6" Thus, pooling arrangements permit a well operator
to apply 10 inches per acre on a field with clay soil and 20 inches per acre
on a field with sandy soil and still meet a 15 inch annual allocation.
Outcomes of the URNRD Regulatory Program: The impact of the
URNRD groundwater management program on aquifer withdrawals is
difficult to determine since pumping data does not exist prior to the well
monitoring/regulatory period. Yet, there are secondary indicators that may
give an indication of the changes in water use patterns both before and after
the implementation of groundwater controls. In the URNRD, stream flow
in the Frenchman Creek serves as an indicator for two reasons. First, the
Frenchman Creek stream flow is almost derived primarily from
groundwater discharge.' Second, the headwaters of the Frenchman Creek
are located within Chase County so any changes in stream flow can be
attributed primarily to county-level changes in aquifer levels.
Figure 1 shows Frenchman Creek stream flows from 1949 through
1992. Stream flow is divided into three time periods. The 1949-1967
period corresponds to the period prior to the widespread introduction of
the center-pivot. The 1968-1979 period corresponds to the period of
center-pivot irrigation and unregulated withdrawals, while 1980-1992
covers the regulatory period. Accounting for these periods and for
variations in total precipitation, stream flow declined by an average
annual rate of 141 CFS-Days between 1949 and 1967. During the
middle period, the decline in stream flow accelerated sharply. Between
1968 and 1979, the rate of decline averaged 1,069 CFS-Days each year."
During the regulatory period, however, the decline in stream flow was
significantly curtailed to an average annual decline of 349 CFS-Days. 3
This finding lends support for the conclusion that the URNRD
groundwater control rules'had a significant impact in altering the rate of
groundwater withdrawals.
PROSPECTS FOR LOCAL DEMOCRATIC RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
The experience in the URNRD calls into question many general
assumptions concerning the willingness and ability of locally elected
resource management districts to effectively manage groundwater. In

61. Pooling provisions were initially established under URNRD Rules and Regulations
for Groundwater Control, Order 1, Rule 2 (d) (1978).
62. Eric G. Lappala, Quantitative Hydrogeology of the Upper Republican Natural
Resource District (1977) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Nebraska-(Lincoln)).
63. Stephenson, supra note 33, at 313-19.
64. Id.at 316.
65. Id.
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Nebraska, the URNRD has designed, implemented, and enforced one of
the most aggressive groundwater management systems anywhere on the
Ogallala aquifer. The obvious question stemming from this experience is
why did this local group supply themselves with a new set of
groundwater use and access rules-especially given the characterization of
other local efforts? The answer to this question holds important
implications for the development and promotion of similar self-regulating
resource management systems.
An explanation to this question for the URNRD can be framed
within the metaphor of the demand and supply of institutional change."
The demand for a new set of institutional arrangements comes from recognizing the net benefits of imposing constraints on use and access rules over
a resource. The supply of institutional change stems largely from a willingness and ability to provide a new set of rules governing resource use.
While this paper is concerned with the rule-making behavior of the
URNRD and thus the "supply side" change, the role of the demand side
issues provides important insights into the groundwater rule changes of the
URNRD. For the farmers in the semi-arid west, the benefits of irrigation are
obvious-irrigation provides lower yield risk, without increasing the cost to
produce a bushel of corn. In the URNRD, a clear, not-too-distant threat to
these future benefits quickly developed during a period of optimism in the
agricultural sector. Furthermore, irrigation benefits were not confined to.
farm operators. Due to the historical changes in agriculture, the
communities in southwest Nebraska have been experiencing gradual
economic deterioration. From the 1930s through the 1960s, the three
counties that comprise the URNRD were steadily losing population.67
While other parts of the state were benefiting from irrigated agriculture
since the 1940s, the future of many of these communities was in jeopardy.
The advent of the center-pivot, however, profoundly changed the
outlook of the community. During the 1970s, the population in the threecounty area increased for the first time since the Great Depression.' The
six-fold increase in corn production that occurred between 1965 and 1975
spurred the rapid new agribusiness growth. In the 1970s, retail sales growth
increased at a rate well above the state average.' Thus, the benefits of
irrigation driven growth was clear and unambiguous not only to the farm
operators, but also to the community.'

66. DAVID FEENY, THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF INSITTONAL ARRANGEMENTS, IN
REfHINKING INsmIrUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES, ALTERNATIVES, AND

CHOICES 159 (Vincent Ostrom, et al. eds., 1988).
67. Stephenson, supra note 33, at 103-04.
68. Id. at 134.
69. Id. at 133-34.
70. Id. at 134-38.
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Yet, an impetus for change does not always translate into effective
institutional change. Other local districts on the Great Plains may have
faced similar demands, but have failed to alter the basic structure of rules
leading to the problem. The water policy literature from the Great Plains
charges these local resource districts with inaction, but often neglects to
provide a comprehensive explanation as to why they have failed. In many
cases an inability to act may be wrongly interpreted as an unwillingness.
A number of factors can be identified that explain the
implementation of the groundwater management program in the URNRD.
The factors that contributed to the URNRD groundwater rules can be
grouped into two general types: (1)situational factors or contingencies and
(2) policy factors. Situational factors are conditions that appear to have
contributed to the development of new groundwater rules that may be
spatially or temporally unique to the URNRD. Policy factors, on the other
hand, are discretionary policies that contribute to groundwater rule
development. The specific explanations identified in the URNRD are
summarized in Table 1. Such a framework can help identify which factors
facilitate effective management.
SITUATIONAL FACTORS
Any pattern of natural resource use, and attempts to govern that
use, are partly a result of a unique confluence of different, and often
independent, historical developments. Historical contingencies obviously
imply a temporal dimension. Leonard Shabman states "choices are made
in response to opportunities and constraints understood to be effective at
the moment a decision is made.""1 In the URNRD, such a set of
opportunities facilitated the development of its groundwater management
system.
Rapid groundwater development occurred later in the URNRD
than it did in many other areas of the Great Plains. When the irrigation
boom ignited in the URNRD in the late 1960s, the understanding of how the
hydrologic system functioned had reached a mature state of development.
Thus, estimating the water flow through the hydrologic system was
possible. As a contrast, in the Texas panhandle region irrigation
development occurred earlier when the science was in its infancy. The
development of groundwater management systems in the 1950s in Texas
n
could not be based on sound hydrologic cause and effect relationships.
Another temporal dimension of groundwater rule-making
surrounds the historical relationship between the surface water irrigation
71. Leonard A. Shabman, Water Resources Management: Policy Economics for an Era of
Transitions,16 SOUTHERN J. OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 53, 54 (1984).
72. See DONALD E. GREEN, LAND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAIN (1973).
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project and the URNRD groundwater development. The possible depletion
of groundwater resources has been viewed historically by irrigators as a
justification for the construction of surface water diversion projects.7 The
possibility of constructing a water diversion project (water rescue project)
meant groundwater regulations could be postponed in lieu of importing
supplemental surface water.7 4 The groundwater mining problem in the
URNRD developed in the transition period of water resources
development. The rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s forever
changed the way these irrigation projects were viewed and evaluated.'h
Importing surface water when groundwater supplies were being depleted
was never an immediate possibility in the URNRD. Unlike other regions in
Nebraska, the URNRD was never a serious candidate for such a project.
Furthermore, farmers in Perkins, Chase, and Dundy counties had almost
no experience with surface water irrigation.
In addition to these temporal dimensions, the dynamics of local
conflicts over water use contributed to the development of the URNRD
groundwater rules. In the URNRD, the dominant use of water is irrigated
agriculture, and therefore the URNRD did not find itself in the middle of
a water war between competing types of users. In addition, industrial
structure may be an important factor in local ability to manage a resource.
Agricultural assets in the URNRD are still predominantly held by local
farmers, but a smaller (but significant) amount of irrigated land is
controlled by limited partnership and corporate farms.76 In the URNRD,
representatives and farm managers of absentee owners have demonstrated
a consistent opposition to the more stringent groundwater allocations.77
If the interests of the local community diverge significantly from those
controlling the productive assets, the community may not be able to
effectively manage the resource.'
The different response to the groundwater rules within the
agricultural community also should focus attention to the belief systems of
the regulated groups. Often the farmers are portrayed as holding a belief
system too individualistic to impose a groundwater control program.
Throughout the history of the URNRD, its directors have almost exclusively
been made up of irrigators. While exhibiting a strong respect for
individualism and private property rights, the belief systems of the

Aiken, supra note 2, at 518.
Id. at 518-28.
J.David Aiken, New Directionsin Nebraska'Water Policy, 66 NEB. L. REV. 22-50 (1987).
Burt Evans et al., Wheels of Fortune (Center for Rural Affairs, Jan. 1976).
Stephenson, supra note 33 at 337-38.
David Todd, Common Resources, PrivateRights and Liabilities: A Case Study of Texas
Groundwater Law, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 233, 259-60 (1992). Todd suggests that a similar
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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irrigators in this area provided justification and support for the self
imposition of groundwater regulations. In general, their belief system
reflects a strong conservation ethic and faith in the efficacy of science and
technology to provide solutions to problems. The URNRD directors do not
consider it an undue restriction on individual liberty to impose
groundwater withdrawal limits as long as those limits are achievable using
readily available technology and reasonable management practices.
Directors typically argue for further reductions in groundwater allocations
based on demonstrated advances in technology that decrease per-acre
irrigation requirements.
The notion of limited government is also identified with an
individualistic ideology. Yet, the local nature of the decision process has
helped alter the pejorative view of "government regulation." Although the
URNRD is an official state-created organization, its board does not consider
its own groundwater regulations government interference. Since all rules
are approved and enforced by irrigators-with the support of the majority
of local farmers-the directors view their rule-making activities as different
than what the "government" does. In short, farmers are not a homogeneous
group and it would be a mistake a blame failure to control groundwater use
on a particular ideology without careful analysis.
POLICY FACTORS
In addition to the situational factors, there also exists a set of policy
factors that help explain the emergence of groundwater rules in the
URNRD. State laws are a group of factors that impact the willingness and
ability of local districts to design and implement an effective set of
groundwater rules. Local groundwater management organizations must
operate under these laws that define the authority of the district to alter
groundwater use and access rules. This set of rules, labeled as collective
choice rules, defines what the district may or may not, can or cannot do to
alter use and access to the resource.' The set of collective choice rules can
be delineated into five groups: boundary, financing, regulatory, decision,
and enforcement rules. This overlying legal structure varies within the
Ogallala region. It is argued here that the collective choice rules in the
URNRD facilitated the development of its groundwater management
system.
Boundary Rules: All local districts operate within specified
jurisdictional boundaries. Boundary rules define the legal domain of local
rule-making organizations. If legal boundaries do not closely coincide with

79. Ronald J. Oakerson, Analyzing the Commons: A Framework,in MAKING THE COMMONS
WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 41 (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1992); Ostrom, supra note

10.
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the physical boundaries of the resource, effective management may be
difficult. For instance, some policy observers have suggested local district
boundaries in Texas may be too small to adequately control groundwater
levels in their areas.'
Control area boundaries in the URNRD roughly coincide with
geographical and topographical boundaries. The aquifer is confined to the
north and south by the Platte River and Republican River respectively.'
Irrigation development to the east is limited to a large extent by dissected
plains typography. Only Colorado groundwater withdrawals on the
western border impact groundwater levels in the URNRD. While declines
in aquifer levels are typically more severe along the Chase and Dundy
borders with Colorado, the additional drawdowns are limited in scope to
only a few miles. Thus, there exists an incentive to design a groundwater
control program since the URNRD is able to capture most of the benefits of
such a program.
Decision Rules: Several features of the decision-making process
also aided URNRD rule development. Decision rules define how changes
in regulatory rules are made. In the URNRD use and access rules are
proposed and finalized by eleven directors.' Research tends to support
that a limited number of participants facilitates decision-making.'
Furthermore, the open and participatory process of rule-making in the
URNRD tends to build trust and diffuse opposition among irrigators. The
URNRD makes concerted efforts through promotions of information
meetings and public hearings to involve and inform the public in the rulemaking process. Although certainly a function of circumstances existing in
the area, the decision-making process contributes to a very high rate of
public discussion and participation.8
Regulatory Rules: Regulatory rules are grants of authority to
impose use and access rules. In the GWMA these grants of authority are
clearly laid out for the NRDs. The GWMA explicitly authorizes the use of
well-spacing and restrictions on use. As a result, the costs and uncertainty
of creating and implementing a set of rules are minimized. Yet, the
language of the GWMA is broad enough to allow local districts flexibility
in the design of use and access rules.
Monitoring and Enforcement: Under the GWMA, the NRDs also
are given explicit authority to enforce regulatory rules. s Enforcement and

80. Todd, supra note 78, at 259.
81. Lappala, supra note 62.
82. The total number of directors in the URNRD is modest compared to NRDs with
more than twenty members.
83. Ostrom, supra note 10, at 198-202.
84. Stephenson, supra note 33, at 186-275.
85. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-663 (1988).
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monitoring rules define what actions local groups are authorized to undertake in enforcing and monitoring groundwater use and access rules. The
URNRD has shown little reluctance to exercise this authority. Throughout
the history of the groundwater program, the URNRD has rarely granted
well drilling variances and has issued cease and desist pumping orders to
irrigators who exceeded their groundwater allocations."'
Financing Rules: Finally, financing rules are required to define how
the local rule-making body generates revenue and who will incur the costs
of collective management. In Texas, the financial limits of local resource
districts have been suggested as a potential barrier to the development of
local groundwater regulations." Although the URNRD relies on a
property tax to finance its activities, the overall tax burden is modest. The
tax base generates sufficient revenue to finance the design, monitoring, and
enforcement of the groundwater program. Furthermore, the multi-purpose
nature of the NRDs enable the URNRD to realize a certain amount of scale
economies from the consolidation of many related administrative and
natural resource functions.
CONCLUSIONS
Too often in the natural resource and policy literature, alternative
institutional arrangements are reduced to either/or scenarios. Vesting a
state agency with groundwater rule-making authority is often argued to be
superior to granting local organizations regulatory control.8 Privatization
is argued to be a superior solution to social discretionary control." Yet,
groundwater allocation systems, like the modern economy itself, will
contain elements of all three.
Given its localized nature, groundwater is a resource with the
physical properties that lends itself to the possibility of some degree of local
control. The experience in the URNRD calls for a reconsideration of the role
of local self-regulation in managing the water of the Ogallala aquifer. The
groundwater control program developed in the URNRD is one of the most
comprehensive of any local or state programs on the Great Plains. The
experience in the Upper Republican NRD should provide an incentive to
direct more attention to the set of conditions which allow and encourage
local design of resource management systems, rather than simply
dismissing the local option.

86. Stephenson, supra note 33, at 254-260.
87. Todd, supra note 78, at 262.
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Figure 1: Frenchman Creek Stream Flow, 1949-1992
(measured near Imperial Nebraska)
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Table 1: The Supply of New Local Groundwater Rules in the URNRD

SITUATIONAL FACTORS (CONTINGENCIES):

Substitute Water Sources

ExistingKnowledge Base

Belief Systems
Dynamics of Conflict
POLICY FACTORS:
Boundary Rules
Decision Rules
Regulatory Rules
FinancingRules
Monitoring/Enforcement

